The Capitol Dome

The Capitol Dome 56.1

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20 THE CAPITOL DOME public's reaction. Hitler could talk for long stretches of time, and Cranston observed that the attention of his audience did not wane or wander at any point. Hitler's energetic speaking style exuded supreme confidence. The extreme devotion of Hitler's followers was almost reli- gious in its fervor. Cranston sought out ordinary Ger- mans to learn from them, to ask questions about their views of Hitler, and to understand the core of Hitler's mass appeal. On the night of 9 November 1938 and into the next day, widespread violence was orchestrated and commit- ted against Jews in Germany after a Jewish teenager was blamed for the assassination of a German embassy official in Paris. This horrific widespread attack on Jews was known as Kristallnacht (the Night of Broken Glass) because broken glass littered the streets from the debris caused by damage to over 7,000 Jewish shops, schools, homes, hospitals, and synagogues. Dozens of Jews were killed while German authorities did nothing to stop the rampage. Instead, German Jews were blamed for the very violence committed against them, and 30,000 Jews were sent to concentration camps where they died from the brutality. Subsequently, German laws made it legal to take Jewish property and livelihood, which led to the mass emigration of Jews. Kristallnacht was the ominous harbinger of even darker times ahead. While he was convinced his pro- fession was a noble one, to report the truth to the pub- lic, Cranston came to see its limitations. He wanted to make things happen, not watch silently with frustration, unable to take part to make a difference. He wanted to act rather than react to injustice. He determined to become involved in American politics or government in some way. Even as a teenager, he had written in his diary, "I want to make a real dent in the world." 4 It was time to come home to America. America's Dilemma: Isolaonism or Intervenonism What did Americans really know about Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and what were their views about the pos- sibility of another European war? There was no consen- sus on whether the United States should fight in another European conflict if tensions deteriorated. Isolationists and interventionists held widely divergent opinions that were influenced by myriad concerns and domestic issues, including the struggle to recover from the Depression. Economic hardship contributed to an America-first men- tality tempered by aversion to foreign conflicts and mem- ories of the high cost of WWI in both lives and trea- sure. Some believed war was inevitable and that America would eventually be drawn again into the European arena. Moreover, though Hitler's anti-Semitism was not new, it became harder to ignore the blatant and increasing persecution of Jews. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws officially barred Jews from German citizenship and institutional- ized the legal definition of who was a Jew. Roosevelt was preoccupied with domestic issues such as the New Deal and the economy as Americans were still digging out of the Depression. On 5 Novem- ber 1940, Roosevelt won an unprecedented third term as president. Although he was not oblivious to the plight of those persecuted by Hitler, he had promised not to send American troops into foreign wars during the campaign. He faced even greater responsibilities and challenges in and out of the public eye than were known at the time. A master politician and statesman juggling the complex relationships with his Cabinet, Congress, labor unions, business community, the press, the public, foreign lead- ers, and his political adversaries, Roosevelt was not easy to read, an enigma known by some as "The Sphinx." 5 As Hitler's strength continued unabated, the debate between American interventionists and isolationists gained traction. Interventionists sided with U.S. allies alarmed over the rise of Nazism and fascism, yet were unsure what role America could or should play. Con- gressional isolationists against America entering a war included Senators William Borah (ID), who served on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Burton Wheeler (MT), and Gerald Nye (ND). Isolationists in the House included Representatives Hamilton Fish ( NY ), Dewey Short (MO), and Karl Mundt (SD). Roos- evelt's immediate predecessor, former President Herbert Hoover, was vocal about his views. In August 1939, only a month before Germany invaded Poland, Hoover reminded the public in vivid detail of the horrors of WWI. In an article, "Shall We Send Our Youth to War?" he stated in part: We were actually at the front in this war for only a few months, but it cost us the lives of 130,000 men. It has cost us 40 billions of dol- lars. A large segment of our people has already been impoverished for a quarter of a century. And the end is not yet. We may need to go to war again. But that war should be on this hemisphere alone and in defense of our fire- sides or our honor. For that alone should we pay the price. 6

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