Issue link: https://www.e-digitaleditions.com/i/1197609
Historical Context During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union raced to develop and deploy nuclear-armed ballistic mis- siles with intercontinental range. The race for ICBM capability was a major driver of the civilian space programs and the rock- ets that ultimately sent humans into space, placed scientific instruments and commer- cial satellites in orbit, and continue to revo- lutionize our lives. Both sides succeeded in obtaining these fearsome weapons, ensur- ing the ability of each to promptly deliver a blow to the other that would devastate far beyond the measure of anything in the his- tory of warfare. In a state of mutual vulner- ability that was generally seen as inescap- able due to the lack of effective defenses against large-scale ICBM attack, mutual fear of retaliation created mutual restraint and an uncomfortable form of stability be- tween geopolitical archrivals. Following the end of the Cold War, ten- sions between East and West lessened but did not disappear, and in recent years have unfortunately risen again. Nuclear forces were reduced dramatically—by more than 85% from their peak—but nuclear deter- rence remains a core element of national security strategies in both the United States and Russia. Under the New START Treaty, each country is limited to no more than 1,550 accountable, deployed strategic war- heads (a term of art defined in the treaty), and no more than 700 deployed missiles and bombers to carry them. These limits went into effect in February 2018 and re- main in force until 2021. Within the limits of the New START Treaty, each side is largely free to choose how to structure its nuclear forces, and both continue to rely primarily on land-based ICBMs and their submarine-launched bal- listic missile (SLBM) counterparts. ICBMs and SLBMs remain instruments of choice for strategic stability and deterrence be- cause they can be deployed in ways that make defeating them—whether prior to launch or after launch—an all but insur- mountable challenge. Pre-launch surviv- ability comes from hiding the missiles be- neath the sea on submarines, or on mobile missile launchers that can be dispersed over large areas of land. The capacity for high alert status is the second key element of ICBM survivability. Early ICBMs were liquid fueled and required many hours to prepare for launch, but modern solid-fu- eled ICBMs can be kept ready at all times to launch within minutes of receiving or- ders to do so. Even for missiles that are not hidden, the ability to launch upon warning that an attack is underway is intended to prevent an adversary from seeking to gain strategic advantage by striking first. When the United States first developed solid-fueled ICBMs with prompt launch capability, it emphasized their readiness by choosing the name Minuteman. The first two variants, the Minuteman I and II, each carried a single thermonuclear war- head, while the Minuteman III—the only remaining ICBM in the U.S. arsenal—can carry up to three independently targeted warheads. The closest Soviet counterpart to the Minuteman II was probably the sin- SPORT ROCKETRY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2020 37 by Aaron R. Miles NAR 84858 Modeling ICBMs Figure 1. Minuteman II missile. Source: The U.S. National Archives.