Sport Rocketry

Sport Rocketry 5.2020

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50 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020 SPORT ROCKETRY During the recent Apollo 11 fiftieth anniversary, I stumbled across two ex- aminations of American space history. The Man Who Ran the Moon presents the life and times of James E. Webb. Webb headed NASA during America's great leap towards the Moon, steered its bureaucracy, allowed backroom deals that needed doing, and honorably sacrificed himself in the name of the program. In James Webb, President Kennedy chose an experienced Washington bureau- crat and political insider. He was a public servant from a time before Congressional ethics probes were the main output of Washington. His career began as the very first U.S. Marine Corps aviator. In time he joined a Texas oil field services company and followed one of its owners who be- came a powerful Senator to Washington. (In that era politicians who also owned industrial corporations sometimes dealt freely in enormous government contracts.) Service in a number of programs through the years broadened his experience. When appointed, Administrator Webb knew how to use the levers of power. A few strangely fragrant political deals helped get President Kennedy's impossible target moving. (Big government programs are famously like making sausages. They taste great as long as you don't look at the ingredients. There is no hint that Webb profited personally in any of this. His sole goal was fulfilling his President's wishes.) Webb ruthlessly held the NASA ma- chine on task. The sheer complexity of it all allowed no other approach. Over his tenure as Administrator he fired space cen- ter directors, division chiefs and contrac- tor officials who disrespected his authority. At least one of his own Assistant Admin- istrators went too. He reassigned entire programs away from centers that failed to produce. Opponents ignored the warrior within the bureaucrat at their peril. He resisted odious Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's increasing demands to shift money from space to winning in Viet- nam via heavy bombing and merciless ac- counting studies. But the Gemini missions showed we were pulling ahead of the Rus- sian bear in space. And the first big Saturn I rocket tests were convincing proof that we were well on the road to victory. In January 1967 the new spacecraft hardware finally reached flight status and tragedy struck. The ghastly Apollo 1 fire re- vealed that much of the program's assumed excellence was a complex illusion. Major changes in hardware, workmanship, and supervision had to happen. Webb and his upper management team held the agency together through the traumatic NASA and Congressional investigations and recovery process. But enemies of the program were cutting funds and hunting scandals at ev- ery turn. He knew he was a visible symbol of the failures that had been. So, following the second Saturn V test in 1968, Webb decided to begin the orderly preparation for his replacement. What followed was a nightmare meet- ing with President Lyndon Johnson: his as- sumed initial planning session suddenly became the President's press announce- ment of Webb's departure that afternoon. He didn't even get to warn his wife! He was soon a classic Washington "non-per- son," shunned and forgotten. When Apollo 11 launched in July of 1969, his successor Thomas Paine was in front of the cameras. Webb was just a guy in the guest grand- stands, losing himself among the crowds. The intense mix of honey and ashes in his mouth must have been almost unbearable. His later career decisions kept him vigilantly separated from the aerospace in- dustry he had once controlled. He died in Reviews by Alan Williams NAR 14137 SR Two Apollo Books Reviewed: The Man Who Ran The Moon by Piers Bizony, and For All Mankind by Harry Hurt III

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