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Fig. 5. "[A] representation of the capture of the city of Washington, by the British forces under the command of Major Genl. Ross and Rear Adm. Sir I. [sic] Cockburn, August 24, 1814, wherein are shown, the fort and the flotilla," e Stationer's Almanac, 1815. is fanciful English engraving conflates the Battle of Bladensburg, the burning of Washington, and the explosion at the Navy Yard into one grand panorama. a large invasion force of up to 20,000 men, and with the arming of former slaves, Cochrane was convinced that "Mr. Maddison [sic] will be hurled from his throne." 10 Cochrane talked in terms of American "Sea Port Towns laid in ashes & the Country wasted will be some sort of a retaliation for their savage Conduct in Canada," and that revenge attacks should be "made near to the seat of their Government from whence those Orders emanated." 11 Despite talking tough, Cochrane had a greedy streak. He later qualified these remarks. Should a "contribution" be forthcoming from towns or cities at the mercy of British forces, their destruction could be prevented. 12 Strange as it may seem to the modern eye, ransom was conventional in warfare of the period. When Major General Ross arrived in theater in command of some 3500 British troops, instead of the anticipated 25,000 under the command of Lord Hill, Cochrane was stunned. e reluctance of senior British army commanders to serve in the American war resulted in a radical reappraisal of military strat - egy as thousands of troops intended for amphibious operations were redirected to Canada. It also soon became clear that Ross and Cochrane did not see eye to eye in terms of taking retaliatory measures. Captain Duncan MacDougall, who would later become Ross's aide-de-camp, recalled that the gen - eral told the Vice Admiral in no uncertain terms that "we had been accustomed to carry on war in the Peninsula and France in a very different spirit, and that he could not sanction the destruction of private or public property, with the exception of military structures and warlike stores." 13 Wholly unexpectedly in the circumstances, Washington, D.C. became a target of opportunity for Ross's "little army" as virtually non-existent American resistance on the ground facilitated a British probing mission led by Ross advancing deeper and deeper into American territory. 14 e specter of Lord Hill's massive invasion force had palsied American morale. With much encouragement from Rear Admiral Cockburn, who believed that the American capital was there for the taking, Ross risked his career by exceeding his orders, which had instructed him not to operate at a distance from the coast. 15 Ignoring Vice Admiral Cochrane's last minute recommenda- tion to abort the attack, he continued his advance. 16 Devoid of cavalry support and with little artillery other than the noisy, frightening, but inaccurate Congreve rockets, Ross made a "dash" for Washington, engaging and defeating Amer- ican forces, mostly comprising militia, which had managed L IB R A RY O F C O N GRE S S PRIN T S A ND PH OTO GR A PH S D I V I SI O N THE CAPITOL DOME 5